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advantage. 25 Fault would arise from a breach of duty or an act of
negligence proximately resulting in loss.
2 6
In American Surety Co. v. Empire Trust Co.27 the Court held
that the question of whether plaintiff's assignee was estopped by
reason of negligence was for the jury. On appeal, however, the
Court of Appeals, speaking through Lehman, J., says : 28 "The drawee
owed the drawer the duty of paying the draft only to the payee
named. The drawer owed to the drawee the duty only that it would
not by act or misrepresentation facilitate a fraud upon it. Alleged
negligence in delivering a draft or check to a person not authorized
by the payee to receive it is 'immaterial' 29 where a party discounts
or pays a draft without sufficient identification of the payee and
upon a forged indorsement. * * * Negligent failure by the drawer to
protect itself against fraud in procuring the making of the drafts
does not cast upon the drawer the risk that they will be paid upon a
forged indorsement."
It is held, therefore, that, as a matter of law, it is immaterial
that the drawer was negligent in not discovering the forgery since
there was no such duty on the drawer to ascertain such fact. The
drawee's reliance on the subsequent bona fide indorsements does not
relieve it from its liability since it is negligence on its part to rely
thereon, and the drawer is not precluded from recovering.
VINCENT G. ROMANO.
UNFAIR COMPETITION.
The law governing unfair competition, although still in its
infancy, is rapidly approaching the point where definite judicial re-
action may be satisfactorily noted as curbing unfair procedure in
trade.
Fundamentally, the controversy involved trade-names.' The
once well settled rule that an injunction would not be granted un-
less there was actual competition in the sale of similar merchandise
Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 716 (1877).
-' Sup' a note 13.
- 228 App. Div. 572, 240 N. Y. Supp. 164 (4th Dept. 1930).
'Supra note 4, at 106, 186 N. E. at 437, 438.
Italics author's.
1 Trade-name denotes "all symbols in reference to which a reputation may
be established (e.g., trade-names, including geographical, corporate and per-
sonal names; devices such as collocations of colors, peculiar sizes and shapes;
distinctive methods of advertising and marketing generally) which, not being
subject to exclusive appropriation, are protected under the law of unfair compe-
tition as contrasted with technical trade-marks, registerable for exclusive use
under modern statutes, and protectable under the common law of trade-marks."
(1930) 30 COL. L. Rzv.. 695.
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or services, was based on the theory that injury would result only
when the public was deceived by the misrepresentation. The tend-
ency today, however, is to grant protection to a firm regardless of
the existence of actual competition. "If the designation of two firms
are identical, or nearly so, and if their businesses are so similar as
to cause the public to confuse one with the other, or to believe that
they are affiliated, the second corporation which adopts the name
will be required to differentiate itself, even though there is no like-
lihood of confusion between their products." 2
The departure from the old rule is well illustrated in John
Forsythe Co., Inc. v. Forsythe Shoe Corp.3 The plaintiff was en-
titled to an injunction restraining the defendant from using the
word "Forsythe" or "Forsythe Shoes" as descriptive of its store or
goods.4  The injunction was granted to prevent threatened compe-
tition which was unfair and calculated to impair the value of plain-
tiff's trade-name or to deceive the public. "Almost invariably the
selection by a defendant for use in his business of a trade-name or
mark which has theretofore been used and advertised by another, is
for the purpose of appropriating its value and reaping the benefit
of the labor of him who may have made that name an emblem of
quality, or of tastes, or a symbol of fair dealing.5 Equity does not
shirk from interfering to prevent such spoliation. Names other than
plaintiff's there are in plenty which the defendant could have
selected." 6
A similar attitude was taken in Long's Hat Stores Corp. v.
Long's Clothes, Inc.7 In an action by the plaintiff to enjoin the
defendant from using the name of "Long's Clothes, Inc." evidence
that the plaintiff conducted the business of selling at retail hats,
and at times clothing, and intended to resume the clothing branch
2 (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1185.
'234 App. Div. 355, 254 N. Y. Supp. 584 (lst Dept. 1932); modified, 259
N. Y. 248, 181 N. E. 467 (1932).
"Prior to plaintiff's incorporation, the trade-name had been used by a firm
selling men's and women's apparel, including women's shoes. Plaintiff, since
its incorporation and purchase of this widely known trade-name, had conducted
retail stores selling men's haberdashery and apparel and had intensively adver-
tised "Forsythe" to designate its merchandise. Plaintiff, except for the occa-
sional sales of ladies' hosiery, had not dealt in ladies' apparel or shoes.
'Judge Hand: "It has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may
have sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his
own exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic
seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good
or ill. If another uses * * * it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose
quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though
the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation,
like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it
only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognized that unless the borrower's
use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification of the
two, it is unlawful." Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972 (1928).
'Supra note 1.
'224 App. Div. 497, 231 N. Y. Supp. 107 (1st Dept. 1928).
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of the business, that no member of the defendant corporation was
named Long, and that no explanation was offered for the coinci-
dence of names, showed intention to take advantage of plaintiff's
trade-name and reputation, causing damage to plaintiff by appro-
priation of good will s and authorized the injunction to restrain
unfair competition, though the defendant was selling clothes. In
the enjoyment of its trade-name the corporation is to be protected,
not only with respect to merchandise it presently sells, but also in
respect to merchandise which the public would believe it was sell-
ing, through deception practiced by another.
Tiffany & Company v. Tiffany Productions, Inc.9 is the greatest
step in the departure from the old rule. Here, plaintiff sued to re-
strain the defendant from using the name "Tiffany" in the defen-
dant's business, claiming that it had established a universal reputation
on a widely advertised business in a variety of lines, including espe-
cially, diamonds, jewelry, and silverware. The Appellate Division
found that the defendant, a motion picture producer, chose the name
for the sole reason of trading on plaintiff's reputation and reaping
the benefits of the public's belief that the plaintiff was connected
with the defendant. This might be called stretching the point a bit.
but it is now a pillar in the competition law. In an opinion of
Coxe, J.: "The real injury in such non-competitive cases is the
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing
goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark the deeper it is
impressed upon the public consciousness and the greater its need
for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular
product in connection with which it has been used." 10
The most recent decision restraining unfair competition ruled
that one might do business under one name and symbolize business
by another.'" In this case, the controversy between the plaintiff
and the defendant was over the use of the word "Universal Tours"
as a trade-name and symbol which described their travel agency.
Plaintiffs' predecessors had adopted "Universal Tours" as a trade-
name in their travel agency business in 1915; in 1924 plaintiffs'
predecessors adopted the legend "Universal Lehrenkrauss Travel
Agency" as the trade-name; in 1925 the plaintiffs adopted "Univer-
sal Travel Agency" as the trade-name; neither the plaintiffs nor
their predecessors had discontinued nor abandoned the use of said
8 "In short, the trade-mark is treated as merely a protection for good will,
and not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business."
Hanover Star Milling Company v. Metcalf, 250 U. S. 403, 36 Sup. Ct. 357
(1916).
'237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dept. 1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y.
-, Advance Sheet 1694, June 17, 1933.
10 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc., 264 N. Y.
Supp. 462 (1929).
"Lehrenkrauss v. Universal Tours, Inc., 262 N. Y. 332, 186 N. E. 802
(1933).
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trade-names; that said trade-names had acquired a secondary mean-
ing; that the defendant company was engaged in a travel agency
business in New York City under the name "Universal Tours, Inc."
and was incorporated after its predecessors in title had received ac-
tual notice of plaintiffs' claim of exclusive right to the trade-name
"Universal Tours"; and that the use by the defendant of the name
"Universal Tours" as a part of its corporate name has caused con-
fusion in the trade with the result that numerous concerns have ex-
tended credit to tourists bearing credentials issued by the defendant
and have forwarded said credentials to the plaintiffs for redemption
in the mistaken belief that said credential emanated from or were
issued by the plaintiffs. 12  Here it was found that the plaintiffs' pre-
decessors adopted the trade-name as early as 1915, and continuously
employed the same, without regard to the name or assumed name
under which they did business. The trade-name remained the plain-
tiffs' property throughout. They identified that name with their
travel agency business. It became a symbol descriptive of their
business.1 3 The symbol "Universal Tours" was inseparably attached
to the plaintiffs' business, under whatever name such business was
conducted; that there was no non-user and no intent to abandon the
name.14 The appropriation by the defendant of the plaintiffs' trade-
name as an assumed name under which to do the same kind of
business and as a corporation, with knowledge and notice that such
name was the property of the plaintiffs', subjected the plaintiffs to
unfair competition and an invasion of the good-will acquired by
them for their trade-name and they are entitled to an injunction
' "The Appellate Division made new findings of fact and dismissed the
complaint. Such findings were based largely on the fact that P.'s predecessors,
after having filed in the Kings County Clerk's office (Penal Law §440) to the
effect that they were conducting business under the assumed name of 'Universal
Tours' and 'Universal Tour Company,' filed in February, 1924, in said Clerk's
office, certificates discontinuing the assumed names 'Universal Tours' and
'Universal Tour Company.'" 262 N. Y. 332, 335, 186 N. E. 802, 803 (1933).
" A person who uses an unregistered name or mark can prevent others
from using the same so as to deceive the public into thinking that the business
carried on by such persons and the goods sold by them are his. Fisher v. Star
Company, 231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E. 133 (1921).
" To constitute an abandonment of trade-marks there must be not only
non-user, but also an intent to abandon. A trade-mark is not the subject of
property, except when it is used in connection with an existing business. Rock-
witz Corset & Brassiere Corp. v. Madam X Company, 248 N. Y. 272, 277,
162 N. E. 76 (1928). "One does not, it is repeatedly declared, lose his right to
protection against an infringing use of the mark (in the absence of laches,
acquiescence, or unclean hands) unless one intends to abandon the rarks. To
establish the defense of abandonment, it is necessary to show not only acts
indicating a practical abandonment, but an actual intent to abandon. Acts
which unexpectedly would be sufficient to establish an abandonment may be
answered by showing that there never was an intention to give up and relinquish
the right claimed, and when the use of a trade-mark is abandoned or given up
with no intention to resume its use, this amount to an offer of it to the public
which anyone may accept." (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 695.
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perpetually restraining the defendant from the use, as part of its
corporate name, the words constituting the plaintiffs' trade-name.
"With the attention of legislatures throughout the country
focused upon emergency measures necessitated by current economic
and financial conditions, it is not surprising that but few statutes
were passed dealing with unfair competition." 15 However, the nu-
merous recent decisions indicate that the day has passed when devel-
opments in this field await the process of change in the judicial
concepts of fair trade.
BEATRICE R. RAPOPORT.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-MISAPPLICATION OF FUNDS BY USE OF
CHECKS-RECOVERY FROM PAYEE.
The courts of this state have adopted certain rules to protect
corporations and trusts from misapplication of funds by persons
authorized to issue checks of such corporation or trust. The general
rule of law on this subject is that even when the officer has authority
to issue checks, a person who receives a check drawn on the funds of
the corporation or trust, to satisfy a debt of the officer, is put on
notice to inquire if his authority extends to such use of the corpora-
tion or trust funds. This question has generally come before the
courts in cases where the officer has deposited in his own account a
check drawn by him on the corporation or used the check to reimburse
the bank for a personal obligation. Another variation is where .the
officer has used a corporation check drawn by himself to reimburse
a debtor.'
In Aneless Corporation v. Albert E. Woodward,2 an officer of
the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant and, in order to discharge
this obligation, issued a check of the plaintiff to the order of defen-
dant. He then deposited the check in a bank in the name of defen-
dant, having endorsed it "for deposit to the account of" defendant
and signed the name of the corporation and his own as treasurer. He
then delivered the duplicate deposit slip to defendant, who was
thereby enabled to obtain the funds from the collecting bank. The
plaintiff sought to recover the funds so acquired by the defendant.
The Court of Appeals held "that we cannot hold that the actual facts,
one of the essentials being unknown to the principal and the other
unknown to the agent, can be so combined as to impute to the princi-
pal knowledge of the whole transaction."
(1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 1194.
'Cohnfeld v. Tanenbaum, 176 N. Y. 126 (1903).
'Aneless Corporation v. Woodward, 262 N. Y. 326, 186 N. E. 800 (1933).
